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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-DURESS OF A PRINCIPAL AS DE-
FENSE FOR SuRETY.-The defendant as indorser on a promis-
sory note seeks to avoid liability, in a suit by the holder
against the indorser, on the ground that the note was ob-
tained from the maker by reason of duress practiced upon
him by the holder. The maker of the note was indebted to
the holder thereof for the sum of $1,540, and was forced
to sign the note under threat of imprisonment. Defendant
became surety in ignorance of such duress. Held, duress
practiced by holder on maker of note is available as defense to
surety indorsing instrument in ignorance thereof or of facts
sufficient to put him on inquiry. Bank of Clinchburg. v.
Carter, 133 S. E. 370 (W. Va. 1926).
In support of this conclusion the court cited Patterson v.
Gibson, 81 Ga. 802, 10 S. E. 9, 12 Am. St. Rep. 356; Graham v.
Marks, 98 Ga. 67, 25 S. E. 931; Griffith v. Sitgreaves, 90 Pa.
161; Hazard v. Griswold, 21 F. 178, and 9 R. C. L. 730, as
cases in point. These cases have been generally so cited.
It will be found that it is at least questionable whether these
cases are authority for the conclusion reached by the court.
In Patterson v. Gibson, 81 Ga. 802, the decision seems to have
been controlled by statute, as the court cites Code, art. 2148-
2149, in deciding the question. The remarks of the court
relative to the common law doctrine have not the force of
a decision and were not necessary to the decision in the
case. In Graham v. Marks, 98 Ga. 67, the defendant signed
a note as surety with full knowledge of the duress of his
principal, to bring about the discharge of the principal from
lawful custody, and the demurrer to defendant's plea was
upheld. In the syllabus to this case it is stated that, "As a
general rule, a promissory note executed under the duress
of a principal by legal imprisonment is not void as to a
surety thereon, if the latter, being under no duress, and
knowing of the duress of the principal, nevertheless volun-
tarily signed the note." Can this statement be construed
as meaning that if the surety has not knowledge of the prin-
cipal's duress, he may plead such duress to escape liability?
The court further decided that the defendant's plea was
bad as the defendant should have alleged the principal's
imprisonment to be illegal, or if legal, for an illegal pur-
pose, and also that a plea attempting to allege that a prom-
issory note was given in whole or in part for the purpose of
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settling the prosecution for a criminal offense (which was
actually the case) is not legally complete unless it alleges
facts showing that the person to be prosecuted was charged
with having committed an act or acts constituting a crime
or misdemeanor. This case decided a point of pleading
rather than the availability to the surety of duress practiced
on his principal as a defense. In 9 R. C. L. 729, 730, it is
stated that the ignorance of the surety of the duress enables
the surety to plead such duress, but Patterson v. Gibson is the
authority for the statement. While a great many cases are
cited by the courts which hold that to make the surety
liable he must be shown to have knowledge of the duress,
most of the older cases were decided on a point of pleading
or because of statutory regulations. In this connection it
is interesting to note that in Griffith v. Sitgreaves, 90 Pa.
161, practically all of the older cases are discredited for
that reason, or because it appeared that the surety was the
father of the principal and was therefore allowed to plead
duress of his principal as it was said this was an exception
to the general rule. However, the court in that case al-
lowed the surety to plead duress because, not having knowl-
edge, he is misled thereby and deprived of his remedy
against the principal. Hazard v. Griswold, 21 Fed. 178, is in
accord but cites Griffith v. Sitgreaves and the cases expressly
discredited therein, and fails to give reasons for the decision.
Griffith v. Sitgreaves is perhaps the best case illustrating the
conclusion reached by the West Virginia court. But does
the reason there stated apply to cases of like nature? "A
contract made under duress is ordinarily voidable and not
void * * * * and may be ratified by the injured party after
the duress has been removed. As a general rule only the
person on.whom the duress was exercised may take advant-
age of it to avoid the contract." (13 C. J., 398) "Duress by
a third person will not avoid a contract made with a party
who was not cognizant of it." (13 C. J. 403) "Duress of a
principal *ill not excuse and cannot be pleaded by a surety,
(13 C. J. 404) although the contrary has been held as to
statutory bonds." State v. Brantley, 27 Ala. 44; Fisher v.
Shattuck, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 252; Thompson v. Lochwood, 15
Johns. (N.Y.) 256. These cases of statutory bonds have
often been held as authority for the general proposition
that the surety's ignorance of the duress enables him to
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plead such duress, although they were decided under stat-
utes which determined the surety's liability in such situa-
tions. As duress is a personal defense, should ignorance
thereof excuse the surety? Where S is surety on the con-
tract of an infant principal, his ignorance of the principal's
infancy does not excuse him if the creditor seeks to hold
him liable. (32 Cyc. 27) Suppose the principal is insane?
A married woman? Can the surety defend on the ground
that 'he contracted in ignorance of these circumstances? In
those cases he is deprived of his remedy against the princi-
pal. Is he misled more when the principal has the defense
of duress? In the West Virginia case and the majority of
cases holding in accord there was an existing debt owed
from the principal to the creditor at the time creditor, by
duress, secured the note from the principal. Arguments
of counsel often claim that if the surety is not allowed to
set up the duress of his principal (the surety being in igno-
rance thereof) that A at the point of a gun can force B to
sign a promissory note, under seal, on which C becomes
surety, (not knowing of the duress) and hold C for the
amount of the note. In such a case C should be allowed
the defense of duress, for there the duress goes to the whole
consideration; it is a defense inherent in the thing itself.
But in the ordinary case where the consideration for the
note is axi existing debt, of which the note is evidence, the
duress by which the note is obtained is a mere personal
defense, and should be available only to the principal. This
distinction is noted in Putnam v. Schuyler, 4 Hun. (N.Y.) 166.
It is submitted that it should have been considered by the
West Virginia court in this case.
-H. R. W.
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